Under 40 U.S.C. § 1315, DHS had the legal authority to designate and deploy DHS law enforcement officers from CBP, ICE and United States Secret Service to help the Federal Protective Service protect Federal facilities in Portland, Oregon.  However, DHS was unprepared to effectively execute cross-component activities to protect Federal facilities when component law enforcement officers first deployed on June 4, 2020.  Specifically, not all officers completed required training; had the necessary equipment; or used consistent uniforms, devices, and operational tactics when responding to the events in Portland.  This occurred because DHS did not have a comprehensive strategy that addressed the potential for limited state and local law enforcement assistance, and cross-designation policies, processes, equipment, and training requirements.  We made two recommendations to improve DHS’ preparedness for protecting Federal property.  DHS concurred with both recommendations.

DHS components used inconsistent processes for administrative forfeitures under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA).  Specifically, we found inconsistencies among DHS components regarding the forms used to notify property owners and the process for responding to claims.  Further, CBP inappropriately used waivers to extend deadlines for responding to claims.  We recommended DHS implement a department-wide structure to oversee component forfeiture activities across DHS by designating an office at headquarters for this role.  Additionally, DHS should develop Department-wide policies and procedures, as well as review component policies, to ensure forfeiture processes and practices are consistent.  We made two recommendations to improve oversight across DHS and provide consistent processes for handling administrative forfeitures.  DHS concurred with recommendation two, which we consider resolved and open, but did not concur with recommendation one, which is unresolved and open.

The U.S. Secret Service incurred operational and temporary duty costs for rental cars, hotel rooms, meals and incidentals, overtime pay, commercial airfare, golf cart rentals, and other logistical support.  Certain details of the cost information related to the Secret Service’s protective operations presented in the report are designated as Law Enforcement Sensitive.  We did not include salaries and benefits for government personnel traveling with the President because the Secret Service would have incurred these costs regardless of whether the President traveled.  Also excluded are costs associated with assistance provided by the Department of Defense, such as the use of military aircraft to transport personnel and equipment, because the Secret Service is not required to reimburse these costs.  We did not identify any fraud indicators or unauthorized costs.  We made no recommendations. 

KPMG LLP, under contract with DHS OIG, audited the United States Secret Service’s financial statements and internal control over financial.  The resulting management letter discusses four observations related to internal control for management’s consideration.  The auditors identified internal control deficiencies in several processes including financial reporting; time and attendance approval; invoice entry and disbursements; and confidential financial disclosure reporting.  These deficiencies are not considered significant and were not required to be reported in our Independent Auditors' Report on DHS’ FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting, dated November 14, 2016, included in the DHS FY 2016 Agency Financial Report.

Most of the deficiencies identified by the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP were related to access controls, segregation of duties, and configuration management.  The deficiencies collectively limited USSS’ ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  We recommend that USSS, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security’s Chief Information Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer, make improvements to USSS’ financial management systems and associated information.

The Protective Mission Panel (PMP) made a number of recommendations in its December 2014 classified report.  The objective of this review was to determine whether the Secret Service has taken or plans to take action to implement the PMP’s classified recommendations, which primarily relate to security gaps and vulnerabilities at the White House Complex (WHC).  The Secret Service has clearly taken these recommendations seriously.  Using funding appropriated for PMP initiatives, the Secret Service began enhancing security and refreshing technology at the WHC.  Fully implementing many of the PMP’s classified recommendations will depend on staff increases, sustained funding, and a multi-year commitment by Secret Service and Department leadership to ensure actions continue even during times of increased protective mission demands and unexpected priorities.  We made no recommendations in this report.