We determined DHS law enforcement components did not consistently collect DNA from arrestees as required. Of the five DHS law enforcement components we reviewed that are subject to these DNA collection requirements, only Secret Service consistently collected DNA from arrestees. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Federal Protective Service inconsistently collected DNA, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) collected no DNA. DHS did not adequately oversee its law enforcement components to ensure they properly implemented DNA collection. Based on our analysis, we project the DHS law enforcement components we audited did not collect DNA for about 212,646, or 88 percent, of the 241,753 arrestees from fiscal years 2018 and 2019. Without all DHS arrestees’ DNA samples in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s criminal database, law enforcement likely missed opportunities to receive investigative leads based on DNA matches. Additionally, DHS did not benefit from a unity of effort, such as sharing and leveraging processes, data collection, and best practices across components. We recommended DHS oversee and guide its law enforcement components to ensure they comply with collection requirements. DHS concurred with all four of our recommend.
Consistent with CDC guidance, most Office of Inspector General employees are currently serving the American people remotely. We are determined to keep interruptions to our operations to a minimum, and we appreciate your patience during this time.
Information and guidance about COVID-19 is available at coronavirus.gov.
- Executive SummaryReport NumberOIG-21-35Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyKeywordsFiscal Year2021
- Executive Summary
DHS components used inconsistent processes for administrative forfeitures under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA). Specifically, we found inconsistencies among DHS components regarding the forms used to notify property owners and the process for responding to claims. Further, CBP inappropriately used waivers to extend deadlines for responding to claims. We recommended DHS implement a department-wide structure to oversee component forfeiture activities across DHS by designating an office at headquarters for this role. Additionally, DHS should develop Department-wide policies and procedures, as well as review component policies, to ensure forfeiture processes and practices are consistent. We made two recommendations to improve oversight across DHS and provide consistent processes for handling administrative forfeitures. DHS concurred with recommendation two, which we consider resolved and open, but did not concur with recommendation one, which is unresolved and open.Report NumberOIG-20-66Issue DateDocument FileKeywordsFiscal Year2020
- Executive Summary
DHS’ capability to counter illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) activity remains limited. The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans did not execute a uniform department-wide approach, which prevented components authorized to conduct counter-UAS operations from expanding their capabilities. This occurred because the Office of Policy did not obtain funding as directed by the Secretary to expand DHS’ counter-UAS capability. We made four recommendations to improve the Department’s management and implementation of counter-UAS activities. The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans concurred with all four of our recommendations.Report NumberOIG-20-43Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaFiscal Year2020
- Executive Summary
From fiscal years 2015 through 2018, in the midst of a growing opioid epidemic, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Transportation Security Administration, and U.S. Secret Service appropriately disciplined employees whose drug test results indicated illegal opioid use, based on their employee standards of conduct and tables of offenses and penalties. Additionally, during the same time period, components have either implemented or are taking steps to evaluate whether employees using prescription opioids can effectively conduct their duties. For example, components have established policies prohibiting the use of prescription opioids that may impact an employee’s ability to work, in addition to requiring employees to report such prescription opioid use. They have also implemented or are in the process of implementing measures to evaluate the fitness for duty of employees using prescription opioids. These policies establish consistent standards components can use to ensure they are allowing employees to use legally-prescribed opioids, while also ensuring their workforce is capable of effectively performing their duties. We made two recommendations to improve components’ oversight of illegal and prescription opioid use by employees. CBP and Secret Service concurred with the recommendations, which are both resolved and open.Report NumberOIG-20-05Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaFiscal Year2020