DHS’ capability to counter illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) activity remains limited. The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans did not execute a uniform department-wide approach, which prevented components authorized to conduct counter-UAS operations from expanding their capabilities. This occurred because the Office of Policy did not obtain funding as directed by the Secretary to expand DHS’ counter-UAS capability. We made four recommendations to improve the Department’s management and implementation of counter-UAS activities. The Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans concurred with all four of our recommendations.
- Executive SummaryReport NumberOIG-20-43Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaFiscal Year2020
- Executive Summary
In December 2014, OIG previously reported on the effectiveness and cost of the UAS program.2 Our report disclosed CBP had not developed performance measures needed to accurately assess program effectiveness and make informed decisions. CBP also did not recognize all UAS operating costs and, as such, the Congress and public may be unaware of the amount of resources invested in the program. This audit determined that CBP has not ensured effective safeguards for surveillance information, such as images and video, collected on and transmitted from its UAS. Without a privacy assessment, CBP could not determine whether ISR Systems contained data requiring safeguards per privacy laws, regulations, and DHS policy. CBP’s failure to implement adequate security controls according to Federal and DHS policy could result in potential loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of ISR Systems and its operations.Report NumberOIG-18-79Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaFiscal Year2018