TSA partially complied with the Act by establishing operational processes for routine activities within its Explosives Detection Canine Team (EDCT) program for surface transportation. Specifically, TSA has a national training program for canines and handlers, uses canine assets to meet urgent security needs, and monitors and tracks canine assets. However, TSA did not comply with the Act’s requirements to evaluate the entire EDCT program for alignment with its risk-based security strategy or develop a unified deployment strategy for its EDCTs for surface transportation. We recommended that TSA coordinate with its law enforcement agency partners to conduct an evaluation of the EDCT program and develop an agency-wide deployment strategy for surface transportation consistent with TSA's Surface Transportation Risk-Based Security Strategy. TSA concurred with both recommendations.
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Transportation Security Administration
- Executive SummaryReport NumberOIG-21-52Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaKeywordsFiscal Year2021
- Executive Summary
We determined that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) did not manage the Recruitment and Hiring (R&H) contract in a fiscally responsible manner. Specifically, TSA did not properly plan contract requirements prior to awarding the contract and did not develop accurate cost estimates for all contract modifications. We recommended TSA establish a cross-functional requirements working group for planning and awarding the R&H re-compete efforts as well as other Personnel Futures Program contract requirements. The working group should develop a holistic and forward-thinking acquisition strategy, as well as implement a comprehensive process for reviewing and determining requirements. We also recommended TSA ensure Human Capital improves contract management activities including, but not limited to, requirements planning and realistic cost estimate development by obtaining additional expert resources or leveraging existing expertise. We made two recommendations to improve TSA’s contract management. TSA concurred with both recommendations.Report NumberOIG-21-39Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2021
Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1)
- Executive Summary
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not monitor the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) to ensure it continues to fulfill needed capabilities. Although the AIT met the requirement for system availability, TSA did not monitor the AIT’s probability of detection rate and throughput rate requirements set forth in TSA’s operational requirements document. These issues occurred because TSA has not established comprehensive guidance to monitor performance of the AIT system. Without continuous monitoring and oversight, TSA cannot ensure the AIT is meeting critical system performance requirements—a consistent weakness found in prior DHS OIG reports. We made two recommendations designed to improve TSA’s monitoring of the AIT system. TSA concurred with our recommendations.Report NumberOIG-20-33Issue DateDocument FileOversight AreaFiscal Year2020
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For Immediate ReleaseDownload PDF (336.39 KB)
A review by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) did not identify evidence to corroborate allegations that a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) supervisor at the Orlando airport directed TSA air marshals or other TSA personnel to use behavior detection techniques to racially discriminate against travelers between 2005-2010. This review was requested by members of Congress based on allegations made in the news media by former members of TSA’s Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS).
In the attached letter to Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Rep. Val Butler Demings, Rep. Bonnie Watson Coleman and Rep. Darren Soto, the OIG reported that apart from the testimony of the three complainants, it did not identify any additional evidence that substantiated the allegations. During the course of the review, OIG found no previous record of similar complaints against the TSA supervisor. Although some witnesses relayed other prior instances of alleged racial profiling in the behavior detection program, none of the approximately 30 current and former personnel OIG interviewed confirmed the complainants’ specific allegations. TSA has since eliminated the behavior detection officer position, and has largely stopped referring travelers for additional screening using behavior detection techniques.
TSA's Data and Methods for Classifying Its Criminal Investigators as Law Enforcement Officers Need ImprovementExecutive Summary
The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) methods for classifying its Office of Inspection (OOI) criminal investigators as law enforcement officers were adequate and valid, but the data TSA used were not adequate or valid. TSA’s criminal investigators spend at least 50 percent of their time performing criminal investigative duties to be classified as law enforcement officers. The FY 2017 timesheet data TSA used to validate that its criminal investigators met the 50 percent requirement were not adequate and valid as the data were not always timely submitted and approved. This occurred because OOI officials lacked oversight and accountability for the timesheet submission, review, and approval processes. Further, criminal investigators and their supervisors did not always complete and approve certification forms as required to verify eligibility for premium pay. In some instances, incorrect timesheet calculations inflated the annual average of unscheduled duty hours criminal investigators worked to be eligible for premium pay. OOI management did not develop and implement guidance to review these key calculations annually. Without better oversight and valid timesheet data, TSA cannot ensure it is accurately classifying criminal investigators as law enforcement officers. TSA also may be wasting agency funds on criminal investigators ineligible to receive premium pay. We made four recommendations that, when implemented, should help TSA improve data used to classify its OOI criminal investigators as law enforcement officers. TSA concurred with all of our recommendations.Report NumberOIG-19-56Issue DateDocument FileOversight AreaFiscal Year2019