TSA acquired CT systems that did not address all needed capabilities.  These issues occurred because the Department of Homeland Security did not provide adequate oversight of TSA’s acquisition of CT systems.  DHS is responsible for overseeing all major acquisitions to ensure they are properly planned and executed and meet documented key performance thresholds.  However, DHS allowed TSA to use an acquisition approach not recognized by DHS’ acquisition guidance.  In addition, DHS allowed TSA to deploy the CT system even though it did not meet all TSA key performance parameters.  DHS also did not validate TSA’s detection upgrade before TSA incorporated it into the CT system.  As a result, TSA risks spending over $700 million in future appropriated funding to purchase CT systems that may never fully meet operational mission needs.  We made three recommendations to improve DHS’ oversight of TSA’s CT systems acquisition.  DHS concurred with all three recommendations.  

TSA implemented 167 of the 251 (67 percent) requirements in both Acts, 55 of the 167 (33 percent) were not completed by the Acts’ established deadlines, and TSA did not complete the remaining 84 requirements.  TSA was unable to complete 33 of these requirements because the actions relied on external stakeholders acting first or depended on conditions outside of TSA's control. The shortfalls occurred because TSA did not: (1) designate a lead office to establish internal controls, conduct oversight, and provide quality assurance for implementing the legislatively mandated requirements; (2) develop formal policies and procedures to ensure consistency and accountability for implementing the requirements on time; or (3) plan or develop an effective system to maintain relevant supporting documentation for the Acts’ requirements to help ensure information accuracy, continuity, and record retrieval capability. Further, TSA had difficulty completing some mandates that required lengthy regulatory processes or coordination with and reliance on external Government and industry stakeholders.  Because TSA has not implemented all requirements, it may be missing opportunities to address vulnerabilities and strengthen the security of the Nation’s transportation systems.  TSA provided a corrective action plan but did not concur with the recommendation.

DHS did not fully comply with the public law.  TSA and the Coast Guard prepared, and DHS submitted, a CAP to Congress in June 2020.  Although the CAP identified corrective actions for one area, it did not address four issues we consider significant.  We recommended that DHS, in consultation with TSA and Coast Guard, re-evaluate the assessment to determine if further corrective actions are needed or justify excluding significant issues from the CAP.  DHS did not concur with the recommendation, but we consider DHS’ actions partially responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation open and unresolved.

TSA partially complied with the Act by establishing operational processes for routine activities within its Explosives Detection Canine Team (EDCT)  program for surface transportation.  Specifically, TSA has a national training program for canines and handlers, uses canine assets to meet urgent security needs, and monitors and tracks canine assets.  However, TSA did not comply with the Act’s requirements to evaluate the entire EDCT program for alignment with its risk-based security strategy or develop a unified deployment strategy for its EDCTs for surface transportation.  We recommended that TSA coordinate with its law enforcement agency partners to conduct an evaluation of the EDCT program and develop an agency-wide deployment strategy for surface transportation consistent with TSA's Surface Transportation Risk-Based Security Strategy.  TSA concurred with both recommendations.   

We determined that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) did not manage the Recruitment and Hiring (R&H) contract in a fiscally responsible manner.  Specifically, TSA did not properly plan contract requirements prior to awarding the contract and did not develop accurate cost estimates for all contract modifications.  We recommended TSA establish a cross-functional requirements working group for planning and awarding the R&H re-compete efforts as well as other Personnel Futures Program contract requirements.  The working group should develop a holistic and forward-thinking acquisition strategy, as well as implement a comprehensive process for reviewing and determining requirements.  We also recommended TSA ensure Human Capital improves contract management activities including, but not limited to, requirements planning and realistic cost estimate development by obtaining additional expert resources or leveraging existing expertise.  We made two recommendations to improve TSA’s contract management.  TSA concurred with both recommendations.