TSA acquired CT systems that did not address all needed capabilities. These issues occurred because the Department of Homeland Security did not provide adequate oversight of TSA’s acquisition of CT systems. DHS is responsible for overseeing all major acquisitions to ensure they are properly planned and executed and meet documented key performance thresholds. However, DHS allowed TSA to use an acquisition approach not recognized by DHS’ acquisition guidance. In addition, DHS allowed TSA to deploy the CT system even though it did not meet all TSA key performance parameters. DHS also did not validate TSA’s detection upgrade before TSA incorporated it into the CT system. As a result, TSA risks spending over $700 million in future appropriated funding to purchase CT systems that may never fully meet operational mission needs. We made three recommendations to improve DHS’ oversight of TSA’s CT systems acquisition. DHS concurred with all three recommendations.
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- Executive SummaryReport NumberOIG-21-69Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyFiscal Year2021
- Executive Summary
TSA implemented 167 of the 251 (67 percent) requirements in both Acts, 55 of the 167 (33 percent) were not completed by the Acts’ established deadlines, and TSA did not complete the remaining 84 requirements. TSA was unable to complete 33 of these requirements because the actions relied on external stakeholders acting first or depended on conditions outside of TSA's control. The shortfalls occurred because TSA did not: (1) designate a lead office to establish internal controls, conduct oversight, and provide quality assurance for implementing the legislatively mandated requirements; (2) develop formal policies and procedures to ensure consistency and accountability for implementing the requirements on time; or (3) plan or develop an effective system to maintain relevant supporting documentation for the Acts’ requirements to help ensure information accuracy, continuity, and record retrieval capability. Further, TSA had difficulty completing some mandates that required lengthy regulatory processes or coordination with and reliance on external Government and industry stakeholders. Because TSA has not implemented all requirements, it may be missing opportunities to address vulnerabilities and strengthen the security of the Nation’s transportation systems. TSA provided a corrective action plan but did not concur with the recommendation.Report NumberOIG-21-68Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2021
- Executive Summary
DHS did not fully comply with the public law. TSA and the Coast Guard prepared, and DHS submitted, a CAP to Congress in June 2020. Although the CAP identified corrective actions for one area, it did not address four issues we consider significant. We recommended that DHS, in consultation with TSA and Coast Guard, re-evaluate the assessment to determine if further corrective actions are needed or justify excluding significant issues from the CAP. DHS did not concur with the recommendation, but we consider DHS’ actions partially responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation open and unresolved.Report NumberOIG-21-66Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2021
- Executive Summary
TSA partially complied with the Act by establishing operational processes for routine activities within its Explosives Detection Canine Team (EDCT) program for surface transportation. Specifically, TSA has a national training program for canines and handlers, uses canine assets to meet urgent security needs, and monitors and tracks canine assets. However, TSA did not comply with the Act’s requirements to evaluate the entire EDCT program for alignment with its risk-based security strategy or develop a unified deployment strategy for its EDCTs for surface transportation. We recommended that TSA coordinate with its law enforcement agency partners to conduct an evaluation of the EDCT program and develop an agency-wide deployment strategy for surface transportation consistent with TSA's Surface Transportation Risk-Based Security Strategy. TSA concurred with both recommendations.Report NumberOIG-21-52Issue DateDocument FileKeywordsFiscal Year2021
- Executive Summary
We determined that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) did not manage the Recruitment and Hiring (R&H) contract in a fiscally responsible manner. Specifically, TSA did not properly plan contract requirements prior to awarding the contract and did not develop accurate cost estimates for all contract modifications. We recommended TSA establish a cross-functional requirements working group for planning and awarding the R&H re-compete efforts as well as other Personnel Futures Program contract requirements. The working group should develop a holistic and forward-thinking acquisition strategy, as well as implement a comprehensive process for reviewing and determining requirements. We also recommended TSA ensure Human Capital improves contract management activities including, but not limited to, requirements planning and realistic cost estimate development by obtaining additional expert resources or leveraging existing expertise. We made two recommendations to improve TSA’s contract management. TSA concurred with both recommendations.Report NumberOIG-21-39Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2021
- Executive Summary
We determined DHS law enforcement components did not consistently collect DNA from arrestees as required. Of the five DHS law enforcement components we reviewed that are subject to these DNA collection requirements, only Secret Service consistently collected DNA from arrestees. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Federal Protective Service inconsistently collected DNA, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) collected no DNA. DHS did not adequately oversee its law enforcement components to ensure they properly implemented DNA collection. Based on our analysis, we project the DHS law enforcement components we audited did not collect DNA for about 212,646, or 88 percent, of the 241,753 arrestees from fiscal years 2018 and 2019. Without all DHS arrestees’ DNA samples in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s criminal database, law enforcement likely missed opportunities to receive investigative leads based on DNA matches. Additionally, DHS did not benefit from a unity of effort, such as sharing and leveraging processes, data collection, and best practices across components. We recommended DHS oversee and guide its law enforcement components to ensure they comply with collection requirements. DHS concurred with all four of our recommend.Report NumberOIG-21-35Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyKeywordsFiscal Year2021
Better Oversight and Planning are Needed to Improve FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance ProgramExecutive Summary
During the course of the audit, we determined that FEMA provided hotel rooms to about 90,000 households (nearly 227,000 survivors) after the 2017 California wildfires and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. However, FEMA did not oversee and manage the Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program to ensure it operated efficiently and effectively to meet all disaster survivors’ needs. We made two recommendations that when implemented, will improve FEMA’s oversight and pre-disaster planning of transitional sheltering. FEMA concurred with both recommendations and the recommendations are resolved and open.Report NumberOIG-21-20Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyKeywordsFiscal Year2021
CBP's ACAS Program Did Not Always Prevent Air Carriers from Transporting High-Risk Cargo into the United StatesExecutive Summary
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) identified and targeted high-risk cargo shipments, CBP did not always prevent air carriers from transporting high-risk air cargo from foreign airports into the United States. This occurred because neither CBP nor TSA developed adequate policies and procedures to ensure air carriers resolved referrals timely or appropriately. We made four recommendations to CBP and TSA to mitigate a number of vulnerabilities in the Air Cargo Advance Screening Program. CBP and TSA concurred with all four recommendations.Report NumberOIG-20-34Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyFiscal Year2020
- Executive Summary
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not monitor the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) to ensure it continues to fulfill needed capabilities. Although the AIT met the requirement for system availability, TSA did not monitor the AIT’s probability of detection rate and throughput rate requirements set forth in TSA’s operational requirements document. These issues occurred because TSA has not established comprehensive guidance to monitor performance of the AIT system. Without continuous monitoring and oversight, TSA cannot ensure the AIT is meeting critical system performance requirements—a consistent weakness found in prior DHS OIG reports. We made two recommendations designed to improve TSA’s monitoring of the AIT system. TSA concurred with our recommendations.Report NumberOIG-20-33Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2020
DHS Should Seek a Unified Approach when Purchasing and Using Handheld Chemical Identification DevicesExecutive Summary
DHS does not have a unified approach for procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices despite the widespread use of these devices across multiple components. We recommended DHS establish a process to coordinate joint needs across components and maximize savings from strategic sourcing opportunities. We made two recommendations that should help improve unity of effort in procuring and using handheld chemical identification devices. DHS concurred with recommendation 1 but did not concur with recommendation 2.Report NumberOIG-20-16Issue DateDocument FileOversight AreaKeywordsFiscal Year2020