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Transportation Security
- Report NumberOIG-21-27Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaFiscal Year2021
CBP's ACAS Program Did Not Always Prevent Air Carriers from Transporting High-Risk Cargo into the United States
Executive SummaryU.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) identified and targeted high-risk cargo shipments, CBP did not always prevent air carriers from transporting high-risk air cargo from foreign airports into the United States. This occurred because neither CBP nor TSA developed adequate policies and procedures to ensure air carriers resolved referrals timely or appropriately. We made four recommendations to CBP and TSA to mitigate a number of vulnerabilities in the Air Cargo Advance Screening Program. CBP and TSA concurred with all four recommendations.
Report NumberOIG-20-34Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaFiscal Year2020TSA Needs to Improve Monitoring of the Deployed Advanced Imaging Technology System
Executive SummaryThe Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not monitor the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) to ensure it continues to fulfill needed capabilities. Although the AIT met the requirement for system availability, TSA did not monitor the AIT’s probability of detection rate and throughput rate requirements set forth in TSA’s operational requirements document. These issues occurred because TSA has not established comprehensive guidance to monitor performance of the AIT system. Without continuous monitoring and oversight, TSA cannot ensure the AIT is meeting critical system performance requirements—a consistent weakness found in prior DHS OIG reports. We made two recommendations designed to improve TSA’s monitoring of the AIT system. TSA concurred with our recommendations.
Report NumberOIG-20-33Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaFiscal Year2020Testimony of Jackson Eaton Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Special Reviews and Evaluations
TSA's Data and Methods for Classifying Its Criminal Investigators as Law Enforcement Officers Need Improvement
Executive SummaryThe Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) methods for classifying its Office of Inspection (OOI) criminal investigators as law enforcement officers were adequate and valid, but the data TSA used were not adequate or valid. TSA’s criminal investigators spend at least 50 percent of their time performing criminal investigative duties to be classified as law enforcement officers. The FY 2017 timesheet data TSA used to validate that its criminal investigators met the 50 percent requirement were not adequate and valid as the data were not always timely submitted and approved. This occurred because OOI officials lacked oversight and accountability for the timesheet submission, review, and approval processes. Further, criminal investigators and their supervisors did not always complete and approve certification forms as required to verify eligibility for premium pay. In some instances, incorrect timesheet calculations inflated the annual average of unscheduled duty hours criminal investigators worked to be eligible for premium pay. OOI management did not develop and implement guidance to review these key calculations annually. Without better oversight and valid timesheet data, TSA cannot ensure it is accurately classifying criminal investigators as law enforcement officers. TSA also may be wasting agency funds on criminal investigators ineligible to receive premium pay. We made four recommendations that, when implemented, should help TSA improve data used to classify its OOI criminal investigators as law enforcement officers. TSA concurred with all of our recommendations.
Report NumberOIG-19-56Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaFiscal Year2019Testimony of Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits Donald Bumgardner, Before the Committee on Oversight and Reform, Before the U.S. House of Representatives, "Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Vulnerabilities in TSA’s Security Operations"
Testimony of Acting IG John Kelly, "The TSA Workforce Crisis: A Homeland Security Risk"
TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security Officers
Executive SummaryThe Transportation Security Administration (TSA) needs to continue to improve its retention, hiring, and training of Transportation Security Officers (TSO). Specifically, TSA needs to better address its retention challenges because it currently does not share and leverage results of TSO exit surveys and does not always convey job expectations to new-hires. TSA does not fully evaluate applicants for capability as well as compatibility when hiring new TSOs. Thus, the agency may be making uninformed hiring decisions due to inadequate applicant information and a lack of formally documented guidance on ranking potential new-hires
Report NumberOIG-19-35Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaFiscal Year2019Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secure Airport Areas
Executive SummaryThe objective was to determine whether TSA implemented proper procedures to safeguard the secure areas of our Nation’s airports and whether airports, aircraft operators, and contractors were complying with TSA’s security requirements to control access to these areas.
We identified vulnerabilities with various airport access control points and associated access control procedures. We made six recommendations related to standard operating procedures, deployment of new technology, identification of industry best practices, and training.
Report NumberOIG-19-21Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaFiscal Year2019FAMS' Contribution to International Flight Security is Questionable
Executive SummaryAs a follow-up to our 2017 report on TSA’s Federal Air Marshal Service’s (FAMS) domestic flight operations, we conducted this audit to determine the extent to which FAMS can interdict an improvised explosive device during flight. We identified vulnerabilities with FAMS’ contribution to international flight security. Details related to FAMS operations and flight coverage presented in the report are classified or designated as Sensitive Security Information. We made two recommendations.
Report NumberOIG-19-17Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaFiscal Year2019