Transportation Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not promptly fulfill its first requirement mandated by Public Law 114-278. Specifically, DHS delayed commissioning a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of the Transportation Security Card Program in enhancing security and reducing security risks for facilities and vessels. The public law required the assessment to begin no later than 60 days after its enactment. However, DHS did not award a work order for the assessment for more than a year after the deadline.  TSA only partially complied with requirements mandated by the public law. Of the six required actions, TSA partially complied with two and fully complied with four. We have concerns with aspects of TSA’s responses to all of the required actions.

Despite dedicating approximately $272 million to ground-based activities, including VIPR operations, FAMS could not demonstrate how these activities contributed to TSA’s mission. Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) operations, in which VIPR teams collaborate with local law enforcement to augment security at transportation hubs through an increased visible deterrent force.

FAMS could not demonstrate how these activities contributed to TSA’s mission. During our assessment of FAMS’ contributions to TSA’s layered approach to security, we determined that FAMS lacked performance measures for the 24 strategic initiatives and most ground-based activities outlined in its strategic plan. Additionally, FAMS’ VIPR operations performance measures fail to determine the program’s effectiveness. FAMS could not provide a budget breakout by division or operational area.

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) intended to expand TSA PreCheck to 25 million air travelers at a rate of more than 5 million enrollments per year. We evaluated whether the current TSA PreCheck Application Program adjudication process will allow TSA to meet its enrollment goals. TSA did not allocate additional resources or staff to the TSA Adjudication Center, which had multiple vacancies and was tasked with manually processing about 26 percent of TSA PreCheck Application Program applications. To make matters worse, in June 2016, TSA PreCheck applications surged, leaving the Adjudication Center overwhelmed with applications to process. As the application queue grew, TSA brought on detailees from other Federal agencies to assist with adjudications part time, but they did not have a significant impact. Further, the Adjudication Center relies on a manual caseload assignment and reporting process, which is inefficient for the volume of TSA PreCheck applications needing adjudication.

We identified limitations with FAMS contributions to aviation security. Details related to FAMS operations and flight coverage presented in the report are classified or designated as Sensitive Security Information. We are making five recommendations that when implemented, should improve FAMS
 

We conducted covert tests to determine the effectiveness of TSA's checkpoint screening equipment and screener performance in identifying and resolving potential security threats at airport security checkpoints. We identified vulnerabilities with TSA's screener performance, screening equipment, and associated procedures. Details related to our testing results presented in the report are classified or designated Sensitive Security Information. We are making eight recommendations that when implemented, should improve TSA's screening checkpoint operational effectiveness.

We determined that although a complainant alleged there were systemic security challenges in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), there were few documented security incidents over the past 5 years, all of which OIA addressed with corrective actions.  Further, OIA has improved the effectiveness of its Field Intelligence Division and the Field Intelligence Officers by hiring qualified, experienced intelligence professionals and implementing clear policies and procedures, but it could enhance officer training.  OIA is also addressing weaknesses in coordination among its watches and perceived delays in intelligence reporting.  We made two recommendations to improve the effectiveness of OIA operations; the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) concurred with both recommendations.