DHS did not fully comply with the public law. TSA and the Coast Guard prepared, and DHS submitted, a CAP to Congress in June 2020. Although the CAP identified corrective actions for one area, it did not address four issues we consider significant. We recommended that DHS, in consultation with TSA and Coast Guard, re-evaluate the assessment to determine if further corrective actions are needed or justify excluding significant issues from the CAP. DHS did not concur with the recommendation, but we consider DHS’ actions partially responsive to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation open and unresolved.
- Executive SummaryReport NumberOIG-21-66Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyFiscal Year2021
- Executive Summary
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not promptly fulfill its first requirement mandated by Public Law 114-278. Specifically, DHS delayed commissioning a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of the Transportation Security Card Program in enhancing security and reducing security risks for facilities and vessels. The public law required the assessment to begin no later than 60 days after its enactment. However, DHS did not award a work order for the assessment for more than a year after the deadline. TSA only partially complied with requirements mandated by the public law. Of the six required actions, TSA partially complied with two and fully complied with four. We have concerns with aspects of TSA’s responses to all of the required actions.Report NumberOIG-19-16Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaFiscal Year2019
- Executive Summary
DHS did not complete an assessment of the security value of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program as required by law. This occurred because DHS experienced challenges identifying an office responsible for the effort. As a result, Coast Guard does not have a full understanding of the extent to which the TWIC program addresses security risks in the maritime environment. This will continue to impact the Coast Guard’s ability to properly develop and enforce regulations governing the TWIC program. For example, Coast Guard did not clearly define the applicability of facilities that have certain dangerous cargo in bulk when developing a final rule to implement the use of TWIC readers at high-risk maritime facilities. Without oversight and policy improvements in the TWIC program, high-risk facilities may continue to operate without enhanced security measures, putting these facilities at an increased security risk. In addition, Coast Guard needs to improve its oversight of the TWIC program to reduce the risk of transportation security incidents. Due to technical problems and lack of awareness of procedures, Coast Guard did not make full use of the TWIC card’s biometric features as intended by Congress to ensure only eligible individuals have unescorted access to secure areas of regulated facilities. During inspections at regulated facilities from FYs 2016 through 2017, Coast Guard only used electronic readers to verify, on average, about one in every 15 TWIC cards against TSA’s canceled card list. This occurred because the majority of the TWIC readers in the field have reached the end of their service life. Furthermore, the Coast Guard’s guidance governing oversight of the TWIC program is fragmented, which led to confusion and inconsistent inspection procedures. This resulted in fewer regulatory confiscations of TWIC cards. The Department concurred with our four recommendations, and described the corrective actions it is taking and plans to take.Report NumberOIG-18-88Issue DateDocument FileOversight AreaKeywordsFiscal Year2018