DHS has not fulfilled most of the 13 responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act. To comply with one responsibility, DHS has a Geospatial Information Officer and a dedicated Geospatial Management Office whose duties include overseeing the Act’s implementation and to coordinate with other agencies. However, DHS has only partially met, or not met, the remaining 12 responsibilities in the Act. DHS’ lack of progress in complying with the responsibilities outlined in the Act can be attributed to multiple external and internal factors. External factors include the need for additional guidance from the Federal Geographic Data Committee and the Office of Management and Budget to properly interpret and implement certain responsibilities. Internal factors include competing priorities that diverted resources away from fulfilling the Act’s 13 responsibilities. We made three recommendations that focus on increasing the resources necessary to comply with DHS’ 13 responsibilities under the Act. The Department concurred with all three recommendations.
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- Executive SummaryReport NumberOIG-20-73Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyFiscal Year2020
- Executive Summary
Since 2017, DHS has continued to make progress in meeting its Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) reporting requirements, but challenges remain. To enable more effective tracking of Federal spending, DHS must continue to take action to accurately align its budgetary data with the President’s budget, reduce award misalignments across DATA Act files, improve the timeliness of financial assistance reporting, implement and use government-wide data standards, and address risks to data quality. Without these actions, DHS will continue to experience challenges in meeting its goal of achieving the highest possible data quality for submission to USAspending.gov. We made five recommendations to help strengthen DHS’ controls for ensuring complete, accurate, and timely spending data. The Department concurred with all five recommendations.Report NumberOIG-20-62Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2020
- Executive Summary
Two years since enactment, DHS and its components have mostly complied with SAVE Act requirements. The SAVE Act requires the Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer (OCRSO), as delegated by DHS, to collect and review components’ vehicle use data, including their analyses of the data and plans for achieving the right types and sizes of vehicles to meet mission needs. Most components developed their plans as required. However, only two of the 12 components we reviewed fully met requirements to analyze and document vehicle use and cost data to help them achieve the right type and size of fleet vehicles to meet their missions. This occurred because DHS did not require components to include data analyses in their OCRSO-reviewed submissions, as mandated by the SAVE Act. Had ORSCO thoroughly evaluated component submissions, it would have identified that components did not fully comply with SAVE Act requirements. DHS concurred with all four recommendations that, when implemented, should improve the Department’s oversight over its vehicle fleets.Report NumberOIG-20-40Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2020
Department of Homeland Security's FY 2019 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper PaymentsExecutive Summary
DHS complied with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) in fiscal year 2019 by meeting all six of the IPERA requirements. DHS also complied with Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments. Additionally, we reviewed DHS’ processes and procedures for estimating its annual improper payment rates. Based on our review, we determined DHS did not provide adequate oversight of the components’ improper payment testing and reporting. We made one recommendation to DHS’ Risk Management and Assurance Division to properly follow the requirements in the DHS Improper Payment Reduction Guidebook.Report NumberOIG-20-31Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2020
Department of Homeland Security's FY 2018 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper PaymentsExecutive Summary
The Department of Homeland Security did not comply with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) because the Department did not meet two of the six requirements. Specifically, the Department omitted the percent of recaptured amounts from the Other Information section in its Agency Financial Report and did not meet its annual reduction target established for one of eight programs deemed susceptible to significant improper payments.The Department also did not comply with Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments, because DHS did not make available to the public its Quarterly High-Dollar Overpayment report for the second quarter of fiscal year 2018.Report NumberOIG-19-43Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2019
- Executive Summary
DHS did not complete an assessment of the security value of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program as required by law. This occurred because DHS experienced challenges identifying an office responsible for the effort. As a result, Coast Guard does not have a full understanding of the extent to which the TWIC program addresses security risks in the maritime environment. This will continue to impact the Coast Guard’s ability to properly develop and enforce regulations governing the TWIC program. For example, Coast Guard did not clearly define the applicability of facilities that have certain dangerous cargo in bulk when developing a final rule to implement the use of TWIC readers at high-risk maritime facilities. Without oversight and policy improvements in the TWIC program, high-risk facilities may continue to operate without enhanced security measures, putting these facilities at an increased security risk. In addition, Coast Guard needs to improve its oversight of the TWIC program to reduce the risk of transportation security incidents. Due to technical problems and lack of awareness of procedures, Coast Guard did not make full use of the TWIC card’s biometric features as intended by Congress to ensure only eligible individuals have unescorted access to secure areas of regulated facilities. During inspections at regulated facilities from FYs 2016 through 2017, Coast Guard only used electronic readers to verify, on average, about one in every 15 TWIC cards against TSA’s canceled card list. This occurred because the majority of the TWIC readers in the field have reached the end of their service life. Furthermore, the Coast Guard’s guidance governing oversight of the TWIC program is fragmented, which led to confusion and inconsistent inspection procedures. This resulted in fewer regulatory confiscations of TWIC cards. The Department concurred with our four recommendations, and described the corrective actions it is taking and plans to take.Report NumberOIG-18-88Issue DateDocument FileKeywordsFiscal Year2018
Information Technology Management Letter for the Transportation Security Administration Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement AuditExecutive Summary
Most of the deficiencies identified by the independent public accounting firm KPMG, LLP were related to access controls for TSA’s core financial and feeder systems. The deficiencies collectively limited TSA’s ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data were maintained in such a manner as to ensure their confidentiality, integrity, and availability. We recommend that TSA, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security’s Chief Information Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer, make improvements to TSA’s financial management systems and associated information technology security program.Report NumberOIG-17-73Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyFiscal Year2017