The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not monitor the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) to ensure it continues to fulfill needed capabilities. Although the AIT met the requirement for system availability, TSA did not monitor the AIT’s probability of detection rate and throughput rate requirements set forth in TSA’s operational requirements document. These issues occurred because TSA has not established comprehensive guidance to monitor performance of the AIT system. Without continuous monitoring and oversight, TSA cannot ensure the AIT is meeting critical system performance requirements—a consistent weakness found in prior DHS OIG reports. We made two recommendations designed to improve TSA’s monitoring of the AIT system. TSA concurred with our recommendations.
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- Executive SummaryReport NumberOIG-20-33Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaFiscal Year2020
- Executive Summary
The objective was to determine whether TSA implemented proper procedures to safeguard the secure areas of our Nation’s airports and whether airports, aircraft operators, and contractors were complying with TSA’s security requirements to control access to these areas.
We identified vulnerabilities with various airport access control points and associated access control procedures. We made six recommendations related to standard operating procedures, deployment of new technology, identification of industry best practices, and training.Report NumberOIG-19-21Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2019
Progress Made, but CBP Faces Challenges Implementing a Biometric Capability to Track Air Passengers Departures NationwideExecutive Summary
In 2017, CBP made considerable progress developing and implementing a biometric capability to track air passenger exits using facial recognition technology. CBP’s Biometric Entry-Exit Program conducted a pilot at nine airports and demonstrated ability using this technology to match 98 percent of passengers’ identities at departure gates. However, During the pilot, CBP encountered various technical and operational challenges that limited biometric confirmation to only 85 percent of all passengers processed. These challenges included poor network availability, a lack of dedicated staff, and compressed boarding times due to flight delays. Further, due to missing or poor quality digital images, CBP could not consistently match individuals of certain age groups or nationalities.Report NumberOIG-18-80Issue DateDocument FileDHS AgencyOversight AreaKeywordsFiscal Year2018
- Executive Summary
We conducted covert tests to determine the effectiveness of TSA's checkpoint screening equipment and screener performance in identifying and resolving potential security threats at airport security checkpoints. We identified vulnerabilities with TSA's screener performance, screening equipment, and associated procedures. Details related to our testing results presented in the report are classified or designated Sensitive Security Information. We are making eight recommendations that when implemented, should improve TSA's screening checkpoint operational effectiveness.Report NumberOIG-17-112Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2017
- Executive Summary
We determined that airports do not always properly account for access media badges after they have been issued, and that the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) current inspection practice of relying on information reported by airports about access media badges limits its oversight of controls over badge accountability. We made three recommendations to improve TSA’s oversight of airport access media badge controls.Report NumberOIG-17-04Issue DateDocument FileFiscal Year2017